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We use data on the stock trades of a large number of individual investors to study how tax 
incentives affect the realization of capital gains and losses. We compare investors' realizations in 
their taxable and tax-deferred accounts, which allows us to identify tax-motivated trading. We 
reach three conclusions. First, we find a strong lock-in effect for capital gains in taxable accounts 
relative to tax-deferred accounts. The capital gains lock-in effect is stronger for large than for small 
transactions, and it intensifies at longer holding periods. Second, we find tax-loss selling 
throughout the calendar year, though it is most pronounced in December, particularly if the 
investor has realized capital gains elsewhere in the portfolio during the year. Third, we observe 
substantial heterogeneity in individual investors' propensity to trade. Controlling for this 
heterogeneity, however, does not alter the relationship between a stock's past performance and the 
realization decision. 
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  The realization-based capital gains tax in the United States presents investors with important 
opportunities for tax management.  Constantinides (1984) demonstrates that investors can raise the 
after-tax return on their investments if they realize their losses while deferring the realization of 
capital gains.  Many other studies, such as Ritter (1988), Poterba and Weisbenner (2001), and 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), note that taxpayers with accrued capital losses have an incentive to 
realize these losses before the end of the tax year and thereby to reduce their income tax liability.  
Year-end tax-loss selling is often cited as one of the contributing factors in the unusual behavior of 
stock returns in late December and early January.   
  While there is no general theory of why investors trade assets, a number of recent empirical 
studies, notably Odean (1998), Barber and Odean (2000, 2001, 2004) and Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001), have shown that asset and household characteristics are related to trading probabilities.  
These studies often suggest that investor behavior is inconsistent with the predictions of simple 
models of tax-efficient behavior in a world of serially uncorrelated asset returns.  Rather than 
realizing losses and deferring gains, these studies suggest that investors are more likely to realize 
gains than to realize losses.  This phenomenon was labeled the “disposition effect” by Shefrin and 
Statman (1985).  They attributed it to investor unwillingness to dispose of assets that had declined in 
value, thereby admitting to themselves and others that their investment insight had failed, and to 
investor willingness to sell appreciated assets, thereby avoiding the regret associated with watching a 
one-time winning investment turn into a loss.  This hypothesis about investor behavior, which 
derives from Kahnemann and Tversky’s (1979) discussion of prospect theory, represents an 
important tenet of the emerging field of behavioral finance.   Recent work on the disposition effect, 
such as Strobl (2003), has begun to explore optimal asset trading rules if asset returns exhibit serial 
dependence, to see whether observed patterns may be consistent with tax-efficient investor behavior.   
  The finding that many investors sell appreciated securities, rather than securities with losses, 
stands in contrast to a number of studies in public finance that suggest that capital gain realizations 
are inversely related to the capital gains tax rate.  This literature, started by Feldstein, Slemrod, and 
Yitzhaki (1980) and surveyed in Poterba (2002), relies on data from individual tax returns.  Tax 
returns track the outcome of investor trades, but they contain no information on the portfolio of assets 
that individuals could have traded.  This makes it difficult to investigate how taxation or other factors 
affect the decision to realize gains or losses within a portfolio.  The findings in this literature are not 
necessarily inconsistent with evidence of a disposition effect, because gain realizations could decline 
when tax rates rise even if gains are more likely to be realized than losses.  Nevertheless, the tax   2
return findings suggest that at least some taxpayers are responsive to tax considerations, while studies 
that report a disposition effect appear to contradict predictions of tax-efficient trading.   
  In this paper, we use a detailed data set on the investments made by a sample of individual 
investors at a large discount brokerage house in the United States between 1991 to 1996 to 
investigate several issues related to capital gains taxation and investor behavior.  We evaluate tax-
induced lock-in effects by comparing trading behavior in taxable and tax-deferred accounts.  We 
provide new evidence on the determinants of end-of-year tax-loss trading.  We investigate whether 
“wash sale” restrictions that prevent investors from claiming tax losses if they repurchase a security 
within thirty days of realizing a loss have a detectable impact on portfolio decisions. 
Because we observe many stock purchases by the same investor, we can allow for individual 
heterogeneity in asset realization rates, while also controlling for the effects of asset returns, turn-of-
the-year effects, and other factors that may affect stock trading.  The ability to control for investor 
heterogeneity in our econometric modeling allows us to test whether the relation between stock sales 
and past performance simply reflects differences across investors, with some investors just happening 
to sell more often than others and also achieving different returns, or whether it reflects behavioral 
differences for most investors associated with asset returns. 
A central focus of our analysis is the comparison of trading behavior in taxable and tax-
deferred accounts.  Since we observe many individuals with stock investments in both settings, 
we can control for individual heterogeneity in trading propensities and focus on how the tax 
differences between these accounts affects behavior.  The disposition effect predicts a positive 
relation between realization probabilities and past returns, while tax considerations predict a 
negative relation.  Under the assumption that the disposition effect has the same impact on 
investments held in taxable and tax-deferred accounts, comparing the trading probabilities in the 
two provides a means to identify the magnitude of tax-motivated trading.  The disposition effect 
should be evident in trading behavior in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts, but the effect of 
taxation on trading decisions should only emerge in taxable accounts.   
This comparison suggests that, for stock purchases worth at least $10,000, the 
probability of selling appreciated stock in taxable accounts falls below the probability for similar 
stocks in tax-deferred accounts, particularly after the stock has been held for a few months.  For 
example, a capital gain of 25% is associated with a 22% increase in the monthly hazard rate of 
selling stock in a taxable account during the first six months after purchase, compared with a 
28% increase in tax-deferred accounts.  Conditional on having held the stock for one year, a 
25% capital gain is associated with a 6% reduction in monthly hazard rates in a taxable account,   3
while there is no relation between past gains and selling probabilities in a tax-deferred account.  
Conditional on being held a year, the probability that a stock with an accrued capital gain is sold 
within five years of purchase is 16 percentage points lower if the stock is in a taxable account 
than if it is in a tax-deferred account.  Investors are particularly reluctant to sell stocks with 
gains in taxable accounts relative to tax-deferred accounts during the month of December.  This 
is consistent with trying to postpone tax liabilities into the next tax year. 
Along with Odean (1998), Barber and Odean (2004), and many other studies in the 
“January effect” literature, we find that individual investors are more apt to sell losers than 
winners in taxable accounts in December.  This pattern is known as ”year-end tax-loss selling.”  
Unlike Odean (1998) and Barber and Odean (2004), however, we consider the role of holding 
period differences as well as investor attributes that may affect loss realization, and thereby offer 
new insights on the motivation for December trades.  We reach three novel conclusions.  First, 
December tax-loss selling is particularly strong for stocks that qualify for short-term loss 
treatment and hence generate larger tax savings for investors.  The realization of short-term 
losses in December increased when the differential between short-term and long-term capital 
gains tax rates increased in the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.  Second, tax-loss 
selling increases when the overall market is doing well or when the investor has realized gains, 
and thus the demand for loss offsets is likely to be high.  This suggests that activity elsewhere in 
the portfolio affects a household’s decision to sell a particular stock.  Third, by comparing 
realizations in taxable and tax-deferred accounts we find evidence of tax-loss selling in all 
months, though the effect is less pronounced than that in December.  For example, a 25% loss is 
associated with an 11% higher monthly realization probability in a taxable account, relative to 
tax-deferred account, in months other than December, while the increase is 81% in December. 
Finally, we are not aware of any previous research on the U.S. capital gains tax that has 
considered how wash sale rules affect individual trading decisions.  We find that the probability 
that a stock will be repurchased within thirty days, if it is sold at a loss in December, is lower 
than the probability of such a repurchase following sales in other months. We focus on 
December loss sales because our earlier findings suggest that they are particularly likely to be 
tax-motivated.  This pattern is consistent with wash-sale rules affecting individual investors’ 
trading activity. However, individuals who realize losses in taxable accounts in months other 
than December are about as likely to repurchase the same security within thirty days as investors 
who sell depreciated stock in tax-deferred accounts are, even though the latter transaction would 
not “poison” a potential tax loss.   4
  The paper is divided into four sections.  In Section I, we describe our data set and present 
summary information on trading probabilities and holding periods for common stocks.  Section II 
presents empirical evidence on the probability of selling individual stocks as a function of holding 
period return and calendar month.  Section III examines the role of wash sale restrictions and 
presents modest evidence that these restrictions affect investor behavior.  Section IV summarizes our 
findings and discusses how to evaluate the relative numbers of, and market impact of, tax-wise and 
tax-oblivious investors. 
I.  Data Description and Summary 
  We analyze a data set, obtained from a large discount brokerage house, of individual 
investors’ monthly positions and trades over a six-year period from 1991 to 1996.  It covers all the 
investments 78,000 households made through the brokerage house, ranging from common stocks, 
mutual funds, government and corporate bonds, foreign securities, to derivatives.  Each household 
has at least one account, but some have many.  The maximum is twenty-one and the median is two.  
Nearly 30,000 households have both taxable accounts and tax-deferred accounts, which are either 
IRAs or Keogh plans.  The data set does not cover tax-deferred accounts provided through work such 
as 401(k)-type plans.  For a detailed description of the data set see Barber and Odean (2000). 
  We focus on trades of common stocks.  These investments constitute nearly two thirds of the 
total value of household investments in the sample.  We use the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database to obtain information on stock returns.  We are particularly interested in 
stock trades made by the households that had both taxable and tax-deferred accounts.  This sample 
criterion ensures that any differences in trading activity between taxable and tax-deferred accounts 
will not be driven by differences in the type of investors in taxable and tax-deferred accounts, as–by 
construction they are the same in our sample.  Of all such stock trades, we considered all purchases 
that did not have matching sales in the sample period, as well as the purchases and the sales that we 
could match unambiguously. Examples of trades that we could not match unambiguously include 
sales that do not have a preceding purchase by the same household earlier during the sample period, 
as well as sales that are preceded by multiple purchases. When multiple sales follow a single 
purchase, we include only the first sale in our data sample.  For example, if an investor bought 1,000 
shares of Microsoft in June 1991, and sold 500 shares in January 1993, we would treat this as a sale 
of the stock position.  This means that our analysis may understate the actual holding period for some 
common stock investments.  However, the circumstances described in the example are unusual: 
ninety-three percent of the sales in our sample liquidate the investor’s full position.   5
A. Summary Statistics 
  Table 1 presents summary information on the number of stock purchases, stock sales, and the 
dollar values of such trades for different years in our sample. Applying the criteria outlined above 
resulted in 414,047 purchases during the sample period, representing 23,877 different households.  
We often restrict the sample to the 97,266 stock purchases of $10,000 or more.  These represent 23 
percent of all purchases, but nearly two-thirds of the dollar-weighted purchases.  Just below three-
fifths of all stock purchases, and two thirds of those valued at more than $10,000, were executed in 
taxable accounts, with the balance executed in tax-deferred accounts.  Fifty-two percent of all 
purchases, and 60 percent on a value-weighted basis, were followed by sales before the end of our 
sample on November 30, 1996. 
  We focus on the interaction between holding period, accrued gain or loss, and the sale 
probability for each stock position.  Our approach differs from Odean’s (1998) focus on the 
“proportion of gains realized” and the “proportion of losses realized” in various calendar months.  
These proportions aggregate positions held for many different holding periods and are thus not suited 
to address holding period dependence in the disposition effect.  Our richer empirical framework 
allows for interactions between holding period returns, calendar months, and tax status.   
  One of the potential concerns about this data set is that it may be unrepresentative of the 
broader individual investor population because a low-cost discount broker might attract high-trading 
investors.  The IRS periodically publishes the distribution of the holding period of sales of corporate 
stock reported on individual tax returns.  Specifically, Auten and Wilson (1999), Wilson (2002), and 
Wilson (2003) report Sales of Capital Assets (SOCA) data for 1985, 1997, 1998, and 1999.  IRS data 
on the realization of all capital gains and losses on corporate stock in taxable accounts enable us to 
make some comparisons with realization patterns in this data set.     
The summary statistics from the IRS data are quite similar to those from this data set.  
Specifically, the left section of Panel A in Table 2 reports the distribution of stock sales by holding 
period, focusing on stock held at most four years, for the four years the IRS has made SOCA data 
available.  Strikingly, the reported holding periods of stocks sold display a rapid decline, similar to 
the baseline hazard functions we will estimate in Section II, with more stocks sold in 1998 and 1999 
with a holding period of one month or less than with a holding period of one to four years.  The 
percentage of stocks sold that has been held one month or less has increased steadily over the period, 
rising from 14% in 1985 to 21% in 1997 to 35% in 1999. Similarly, the fraction of stock sold with a 
holding period of one to four years has fallen from 47% in 1985 to 29% in 1997 to 23% in 1999.     6
To compare the IRS data with our brokerage house data, we focus on stock sales during 
1995, the last full year in our sample.  We focus on sales in 1995 that we can link back to the original 
purchase.  Since the data set starts in 1991, that means we can trace back sales to their original 
purchase as long as the holding period is at most four years.  The right section of Panel A in Table 2 
reports the distribution of stock sales by holding period, again focusing on stocks held at most four 
years, for sales in taxable accounts during 1995 in the brokerage house data.  The most directly 
comparable published IRS data, both in terms of closeness in date as well as closeness in stock 
market environment, are the data for 1997.  The return on S&P 500 was 38% in 1995 and 33% in 
1997.  The distributions of holding periods are remarkably similar.  The percentage of stocks sold 
with a holding period of one month or less is 21% in both data sets and the proportion of sales with a 
holding period of one to four years is remarkably close: 29% in the IRS data and 30% in the 
brokerage house data.  The distribution of sales of stocks originally purchased for $10,000 or more, 
the sample of “large” purchases on which we will later focus attention, features more sales with 
shorter holding periods relative to sales with longer holding periods.  This result foreshadows the 
stronger capital gain lock-in effect we will report for larger purchases.  
Finally, Panel B of Table 2 reports the distribution of stock sales by both holding period and 
calendar month of the sale, disaggregated by whether the stock had a capital gain or capital loss when 
it was sold.  The distributions for gains and losses reported on tax returns in 1997 are very similar to 
the respective distributions for gains and losses recorded in the brokerage house data in 1995.  The 
percentage of sales in December is also similar in the two data sets. Indeed, 16.9% of realizations of 
losses occur in December in the brokerage house data, compared to 14.2% of loss realizations 
reported on tax returns, whereas December realizations of gains represent 6.6% and 8.4% of gain 
realizations, respectively.  While the IRS data are useful for benchmarking how representative the 
trading activities of customers of the brokerage house are of the general individual investor, they 
cannot be used to study how the probability of realization depends on the stock’s gain or loss. Any 
such analysis requires a data set like ours that records the timing of stock purchases as well as sales.  
B.  Graphical Summary of Holding Periods and Trading Probabilities 
  We begin our analysis of how stock appreciation or depreciation affects realization 
probabilities by calculating hazard functions for the probability of selling stock.  Figure 1 reports the 
hazard rate—the probability of sale in a given month conditional on holding the stock until that 
point—for holding periods between one and 36 months.  The figure shows the hazard rate for all 
stock purchases in taxable accounts (the dashed line), as well as the hazard for all stocks in taxable   7
accounts that experienced a gain between their date of purchase and the beginning of the specified 
month (full black line), and all stocks that experienced a loss (full gray line).  We focus on stocks 
purchased during January, so turn-of-the-year trading will be reflected in months 12, 24, and 36 after 
purchase.  We array the data so that each stock purchase is indexed by i, and we consider the 
probability that position i is liquidated t months after purchase, conditional on not having been sold 
until that date.  The hazard functions in this case are linear probability models of the form 
(1)                 SELLi,t = αt + β1, t*I(GAIN)i, t-1 + β2, t*I(LOSS)i, t-1 + εi,t 
where I(GAIN)i, t-1 and I(LOSS)i, t-1 are indicator variables for stocks that have experienced an 
increase or decrease in price since the date of purchase, respectively.   
SELLi,t is an indicator variable set to unity if stock position i is liquidated t months after it 
was purchased, and set to zero otherwise.  The specification allows for differential hazard rates for 
stocks with losses and gains.  The constant term, αt, represents the baseline hazard probability that 
the stock will be sold t months after it was purchased, conditional on having not been sold previously 
and having zero capital appreciation at the start of month t.  The hazard rate for selling a stock  t 
months after purchase if the stock has a gain is αt + β1, t, while the hazard rate for a stock with a loss 
is αt + β2, t.  Because we only observe the stock return since purchase starting with the second month 
after purchase, we assign the unconditional probability of sale in month one to both gains and losses.   
  Figure 1 shows that the hazard rate for stock sale in the taxable account drops quickly in the 
first six months after the date of purchase.  The hazard rate is fifteen percent during the first month, 
but it drops to less than five percent per month after six months and continues to decline at longer 
holding periods, falling to less than 2% per month after 18 months.  This pattern is observed both for 
stocks with gains and for stocks with losses.  At most holding periods, the hazard rate for stocks with 
gains is higher than that for stocks with losses.  Figure 2 presents analogous information for stock 
purchases of at least $10,000, adding hazard rates for stocks with gains and losses in tax-deferred 
accounts.  This sample of large purchases in taxable accounts is likely to be more affected by tax-
related motivations for sale, as the tax consequence of a trade is higher given the increased value.  
The exponential decline in hazard rates is the same as that in Figure 1, although the hazard rates for 
the first months after purchase are significantly higher than that for the whole sample.  Figure 2 
presents our first evidence of the capital gains lock-in effect, as after the first few months the 
probability of a realization of a gain in a taxable account falls below that in a tax-deferred account.   
  To facilitate the interpretation of this information on selling patterns, Figure 3 reports the 
cumulative probability that an investor who purchases stock in a taxable account will sell that stock   8
by various holding periods.  If h(t) denotes the hazard rate in month t, the probability that the stock is 
still held at the end of month t is Πs=1,t(1–h(s)).  The probability that the stock is sold in month t is 
h(t)*Πs=1,t–1 (1–h(s)).  The two solid lines present sale probabilities calculated for all positions in the 
sample, while the two dashed lines correspond to the positions for which the investor’s initial 
purchase was at least $10,000.  The cumulative probability of sale is calculated from the hazard 
function estimates for each month up to the given holding period.   
  Figure 3 suggests several conclusions.  First, cumulative sale probabilities rise rapidly in the 
months just after purchase, but flatten out soon thereafter.  By six months after purchase, roughly 
two-fifths of stocks have been sold, by one year after the date of purchase nearly one-half of all 
stocks have been sold, and by three years after purchase nearly two-thirds have been sold.  This is 
indicative of the reduced likelihood of sale in a given month as the holding period increases.  Second, 
sale probabilities for stocks with gains are higher than the corresponding probabilities for stocks with 
losses, both in the entire sample and in the sample of large purchases.  This can be seen by 
comparing the lines with the same pattern, but different colors, in the figure.  By one year after the 
date of purchase, the probability that the stock has been sold is more than 50 percent if the stock had 
a capital gain at the beginning of every month since the time of purchase.  The probability is lower, 
44 percent, if the share had a loss at the beginning of every month since purchase.  This confirms 
Odean’s (1998) “disposition effect” findings.  Finally, sale probabilities are marginally higher for the 
sample of large stock purchases than for the entire sample.  At the twenty-four month horizon, the 
cumulative sale probability for a stock that never closed at a loss at the end of any month, and with 
an initial $10,000 purchase, is 69 percent, compared with 63 percent for the sample of all purchases. 
  If the realization-based capital gains tax discourages investors from selling appreciated 
securities and encourages them to realize losses, then we should see differences in the cumulative 
sale probabilities between taxable and tax-deferred accounts for stock purchases with both 
subsequent gains and subsequent losses.  To that end, Figure 4 reports the differences between 
cumulative sale probabilities for stocks held in different types of accounts.  The solid black line is the 
differential cumulative sale probability for stocks that have had gains at the beginning of every 
month since the date of purchase and the dashed black line is the analogous plot for stock purchases 
of more than $10,000.  For large stock purchases, the sale probability after two years is eight percent 
lower in taxable than in tax-deferred accounts, as capital gains tax “lock-in” would predict. 
The solid gray line in Figure 4, which corresponds to all purchases, and the dashed gray line, 
which corresponds to purchases in excess of $10,000, are the differentials between the cumulative   9
sale probabilities in taxable and tax-deferred accounts for stocks that had experienced losses at the 
beginning of each of the months since purchase.  The probability of realizing losses is higher in 
taxable accounts than it is in tax-deferred accounts, and Figure 4 offers some evidence that the 
difference between the sale probabilities in taxable and tax-deferred accounts declines with the size 
of the purchase. 
  The disparities in cumulative holding periods for stocks with gains and losses suggest a more 
detailed analysis of the monthly holding periods for stocks.  We next estimate a number of 
regressions of the form: 
(2)                 SELLi,t = αt + β1, t*GAINi, t-1 + β2, t*LOSSi, t-1 + εi,t 
where GAINi, t-1 = max(Return i, t-1, 0), and LOSSi, t-1 = min(Return i, t-1, 0).  As before, SELLi,t is an 
indicator variable set to unity if stock position i is liquidated t months after it was purchased, and is 
set to zero otherwise. Note that, under these definitions, GAIN is non-negative and LOSS is non-
positive.  This implies that a positive coefficient on GAIN raises the probability of stock sale, while a 
negative coefficient on LOSS does the same.  Once again, because we only observe the stock return 
since purchase starting with the second month after purchase, we assign the unconditional probability 
of sale in month one to both gains and losses. The resulting coefficient estimates for the sample of 
large purchases (i.e., purchases of $10,000 or more) are shown in Table 3.  Each regression is 
estimated using the sample of stock positions that were not liquidated until at least the holding period 
indicated in the first column of the table.   
  To summarize the results graphically, we focus on a hypothetical position that exhibits a gain 
of 25 percent since date of purchase at the end of every subsequent month, and a position that 
exhibits a loss of 25 percent in an analogous manner.  Figure 5a shows that, for assets held in taxable 
accounts, the disposition effect is particularly clear in the first few months after the date of purchase.  
In the second month of ownership, for example, the probability of sale for a stock with a 25 percent 
gain is five percentage points higher than the analogous probability for a stock that has experienced 
no change in value (the leftmost black bar in the figure).  The sale probability for a stock with a 25 
percent loss is 2.4 percent lower than that for a stock with no price change (the leftmost white bar).  
By six months after the date of purchase, the differential sale probabilities that results from a gain or 
a loss are fairly small. 
  Figure 5b contrasts the sale probability for stocks with 25 percent gains, and 25 percent 
losses, in taxable and tax-deferred accounts.  The likelihood of selling a position with an unrealized 
gain of 25 percent is greater in the tax-deferred than it is in the taxable account, particularly for short   10
holding periods.  Moreover, the probability of selling a position with a loss is higher in the taxable 
than it is in the tax-deferred account.  Thus, while there is a positive relation between returns and 
stock sales over holding periods less than a year (as shown in Figure 5a), it is less positive in taxable 
than in tax-deferred accounts (as shown in Figure 5b).  This finding is consistent with tax motivations 
to realize losses and to defer realizations of gains for stocks held in taxable accounts, but not for 
those held in tax-deferred accounts. 
  Taken together, the selling patterns in Figures 1 through 5 suggest that taxable investors are 
deterred from realizing gains by the presence of realization-based capital gains taxes.  Previous 
research suggests that loss realization behavior may be different at the end of the calendar year than 
at other times.  Since our data allow us to track both the dates at which shares are sold and the 
holding period of the sales, we are able to confirm in unreported analyses that the realization of 
losses increases dramatically in December, particularly in the last week of December.  Barber and 
Odean (2004) report a similar finding about year-end tax-loss selling when they contrast the 
proportion of gains realized and losses realized by calendar month in taxable and tax-deferred 
accounts.  They find that the ratios for taxable and tax-deferred accounts are very similar in all 
months except December, when the ratio for taxable accounts drops dramatically while the ratio for 
tax-deferred accounts remains stable.  Their findings suggest that tax-loss selling takes place in 
December, but, because their methodology does not allow the realization rate to vary with the 
holding period, it cannot assess the lock-in effect directly, nor can it disentangle the effects of asset 
price changes, holding period, and calendar month.  By contrast, our econometric modeling is 
designed precisely to address these issues. 
II.  Tax Incentives and Stock Sales 
  To disentangle the contributory effects of calendar month, holding period, and embedded 
capital gains and losses on investor trading decisions, we estimate hazard models for stock sales in 
various circumstances using a variety of nonparametric and parametric models.  Since investors in 
our data purchase seventeen stocks on average, and the median investor purchases nine stocks, over 
the six-year sample, we are able to control for household heterogeneity in the propensity to sell stock.  
We can therefore investigate the robustness of our findings on lock-in and disposition effects with 
respect to various approaches to modeling household heterogeneity.   11
A. Cox Proportional Hazards Models with Nonparametric Baseline Hazards 
  We estimate a Cox proportional hazards model with GAIN, LOSS, and a range of indicator 
variables for the characteristics of the holding period as variables that shift the realization probability.   
The baseline hazard rate is estimated non-parametrically, following the methods of Han and 
Hausman (1990) and Meyer (1990).  The proportional hazards specification assumes that the hazard 
function for the sale of stock purchase i, t months after the purchase, takes the form 
(3)          hi(t) = γ0(t) * e
Xβi, t 
where γ0(t) denotes the baseline hazard.  We begin with a simple specification that focuses on the 
link between gains, losses, the end of the calendar year, and trading decisions:  
(4)              Xβi, t =  β1*GAINi, t-1 +  β2*GAINi, t-1*Decemberi, t + β3*LOSSi, t-1 + 
  β4*LOSSi, t-1*Decemberi, t + β5*Decemberi, t + εi, t,  
We report hazard function estimates for the full sample of stock purchases, but we focus most of our 
analysis on the sample of purchases with an initial value of more than $10,000.  The disposition 
effect predicts households will sell stocks with accrued gains and hold stocks with accrued losses. In 
terms of specification (4), this implies that β1 > 0 and β3 > 0.  Tax-motivated trading predicts exactly 
the opposite—households will hold stocks with accrued gains and sell stocks with accrued losses.  In 
terms of specification (4), this implies that β1 < 0 and β3 < 0.  Further, a desire to postpone the 
realization of gains into the next tax year implies β2 < 0 (i.e., investors are less apt to realize gains in 
December) and a desire to capture tax losses in the current calendar year implies β4 < 0 (i.e., 
investors are more apt to realize losses in December).  Thus, positive coefficients on GAIN and 
LOSS are consistent with the disposition effect dominating, while negative coefficients are consistent 
with tax motivations dominating. 
We also report hazard models for taxable accounts as well as models for all accounts with an 
indicator variable and interaction terms to test for statistical differences between behavior in taxable 
and tax-deferred accounts.  In this case, the specification becomes: 
(5)        Xβi, t =  β1*GAINi, t-1 +  β2*GAINi, t-1*Decemberi, t + β3*LOSSi, t-1 + 
  β4*LOSSi, t-1*Decemberi, t + β5*Decemberi, t + 
  β6*GAINi, t-1*TAXi +  β7*GAINi, t-1*Decemberi, t*TAXi + β8*LOSSi, t-1*TAXi + 
  β9*LOSSi, t-1*Decemberi, t*TAXi + β10*Decemberi, t*TAXi + εi, t,    12
where TAXi is an indicator variable for stock position i being held in a taxable account.  The baseline 
hazard rates are estimated separately for taxable and tax-deferred accounts.  In this specification, the 
disposition effect should be reflected in the coefficients β1 through β5, while the coefficients on the 
variables interacted with TAX will reflect the importance of tax-motivated trading.  To the extent 
that psychological motivations like the disposition effect are more pronounced in taxable relative to 
tax-deferred accounts, the interaction terms of TAX with GAIN/LOSS will understate the magnitude 
of tax-motivated trading.  Whether such motivations are different in different accounts is unclear.  
Barber and Odean (2004) present evidence that there is more trading in taxable accounts, which may 
indicate different perceptions of the two accounts.   
  Table 4 presents our hazard function estimates for both the full sample of all transactions 
(upper panel) as well as the sample of large purchases (bottom panel).  The findings provide explicit 
confirmation for many of the effects that we observed in the figures.  In particular, the coefficient on 
LOSS for taxable accounts is positive for the full sample and for the large-transaction sample, 
suggesting that in most months a larger loss leads to a lower probability of gain realization.  The 
coefficient for the interaction term LOSS*December, however, is strongly negative, indicating that a 
loss in December is much more likely to be realized.  The LOSS coefficient of 1.03 for the full 
sample implies that in non-December months the monthly hazard rate for a stock that has lost 25 
percent of its value since the date of purchase is 23% lower than that for a stock with no price change 
(i.e., e
1.03*(-0.25) - 1 = -0.23).  But, in December the stock with the accrued loss is 35 percent more 
likely to be sold than the stock with no price change (i.e., e
(1.03-2.23)*(-0.25) - 1 =  0.35). 
  The results in Table 4 show that the coefficient on GAIN is positive for the sample of all 
transactions, but only one tenth as large as the LOSS coefficient for the sample of all purchases, and 
negative but statistically indistinguishable from zero for the large-transaction sample.  This suggests 
that, particularly for smaller purchases, the disposition effect is more pronounced than tax-motivated 
trading and thus favorable returns make realizations more likely.   
Table 4 also presents estimates of equation (5), which permits a comparison of the hazard 
model coefficients for taxable accounts and those for tax-deferred accounts.  While there is little 
difference in the propensity to realize gains in taxable and tax-deferred accounts for the full sample 
of purchases, we do find evidence of a capital gains lock-in effect for larger purchases (coefficient 
estimate of –0.09), which is even stronger during the month of December (coefficient estimate of –
0.22).  The LOSS*December interaction is substantially smaller in tax-deferred accounts than it is in 
taxable accounts.  This suggests that, as is generally accepted in the literature, that tax considerations   13
may explain a substantial part of the year-end trading patterns.  Further, by comparing realizations in 
taxable and tax-deferred accounts we find evidence of tax-loss selling in all months, though the effect 
is more muted in the non-December months.  For example, a 25% loss is associated with an 11 
percent higher monthly hazard rate in taxable accounts relative to tax-deferred accounts in non-
December months (i.e., e
-0.40*(-0.25) - 1 = 0.11), consistent with a desire to realize a tax deduction, 
while the comparable boost in December is 81% (i.e., e
(-0.40-1.97)*(-0.25) - 1 =  0.81).  Comparable 
effects are found for losses on larger purchases.  Controlling for returns, the trading rate in taxable 
accounts is higher in December than it is in other months.    
  One concern in modeling investors’ trading decisions is the role of heterogeneity with respect 
to holding periods and trading risk.  The Cox proportional hazards model, which allows for a general 
baseline hazard function λ(t), can be generalized to allow for investor-specific λh(t) functions.  Gonul 
and Srinivasan (1993) provide an example of how investor heterogeneity in hazard models can be 
studied with repeat-spell data.  Relatively few studies in economics, however, have estimated hazard 
models with repeat-spell data, so the estimation of household-specific baseline hazards is unusual.  
  The rightmost three columns of Table 4 incorporate investor-specific baseline hazard 
functions into the estimation.  Our findings with investor-specific baselines for taxable accounts are 
very similar to those with a constrained baseline, although the coefficient on GAIN nearly doubles in 
size, and evidence for capital gains lock-in is somewhat stronger.  The positive effect on GAIN is 
also observed for the large transaction sample: the statistically insignificant negative coefficient 
without investor-specific baselines becomes positive and statistically significant with investor effects.  
This suggests that, once we control for individual-specific sale rates, there is a more pronounced 
disposition effect, particularly in tax-deferred accounts.  The disposition effect is still smaller for 
larger stock purchases than it is for the whole sample.  The similarity of the other coefficients with 
and without investor specific baselines suggests that investor heterogeneity cannot explain the 
different findings for large and small stock purchases. 
  The sensitivity of our results from Table 4 to the size of the initial stock purchase leads us to 
estimate separate hazard models for stock purchases of various sizes.  For example, the tax 
consequence of realizing a gain or loss for a stock purchase of $500 is substantially less than that for 
$10,000.  Table 5 reports our findings. For taxable accounts, as well as for taxable accounts relative 
to tax-deferred accounts, the GAIN variable has a positive effect on sale probability for the smallest 
transactions, but this effect diminishes as the value of the stock position increases.  Focusing on gains 
in taxable accounts, the disposition effect seems to outweigh tax motivations for all but the $10,000+   14
purchases.  When we compare transactions in taxable accounts to those in tax-deferred accounts, we 
find evidence of capital gains lock-in for purchases $5,000+.  For LOSS, the coefficient is positive 
for taxable accounts regardless of the size of the initial purchase.  The table also shows that, when we 
compare taxable and tax-deferred accounts, a loss raises the sale probability by a larger margin for 
taxable purchases than it does for tax-deferred purchases of all sizes, but the strongest effect is 
observed for the largest transactions.   
These results disaggregated by purchase size are consistent with individuals engaging in 
more tax-motivated trading when the tax consequences of the trade are larger.  However, they could 
also be explained by a correlation between investor sophistication and purchase size.  To address this 
alternative explanation, in Table 6 we disaggregate results by both size of the purchase and the total 
brokerage account balance at the end of the year prior to the stock purchase (our proxy for financial 
sophistication).  The relation between accrued gains and losses and stock realizations is fairly robust 
across account balances.  We also find that in taxable accounts, regardless of the overall size of the 
account, gains are less apt to be realized and losses are more apt to be realized in December than in 
other months for large purchases (i.e., $10,000 or more) than they are for smaller purchases.  As 
shown in the last two columns, greater tax-motivated trading for larger purchases, where the tax 
consequence of the transaction is greater, also is robust to the inclusion of investor-specific baselines. 
  The LOSS and GAIN effects estimated so far are averages across all holding periods, yet we 
know that these effects may differ by holding period.  For example, the GAIN effect might be 
positive shortly after purchase, as high returns induce traders to sell and lock in gains due to the 
disposition effect, while over the long-term, an investor may be reluctant to realize a sizeable gain as 
a result of the associated tax penalty.  Previous research on loss realizations also suggests that 
whether the losses are long-term or short-term also can be important for realization decisions.  To 
explore this issue, we generalize equation (4) to allow both GAIN and LOSS effects to differ by 
holding period.  This yields the specification  
(6)        Xβi, t =  β1*GAINi, t-1 + β2*GAINi, t-1*(Month ≤ 6)i, t + β3*GAINi, t-1*(Month 7-12)i, t + 
  β4*GAINi, t-1*Decemberi, t + β5*GAINi, t-1*(Month ≤ 6)i, t*Decemberi, t + 
  β6*GAINi, t-1*(Month 7-12)i, t*Decemberi, t +  β7*LOSSi, t-1 + 
  β8*LOSSi, t-1*(Month ≤ 6)i, t + β9*LOSSi, t-1*(Month 7-12)i, t + 
  β10*LOSSi, t-1*Decemberi, t + β11*LOSSi, t-1*(Month ≤ 6)i, t*Decemberi, t + 
  β12*LOSSi, t-1*(Month 7-12)i, t*Decemberi, t +  β13*Decemberi, t + 
  β14*Decemberi, t*(Month ≤ 6)i, t*+ β15*Decemberi, t*(Month 7-12)i, t + εi, t,    15
where variables such as “Month 7-12” are indicator variables that describe a holding period of 
between 7 and 12 months.  This specification permits us to study both the timing of sales relative to 
the turn of the year and the timing relative to the expiration of the 12
th month since purchase, the 
holding period that qualified for short-term tax status during our sample.    
Table 7 reports estimates of the model described in equation (6).  The coefficient patterns 
uncover richer trading patterns based on gains and losses than the estimates in Table 4 suggested.  
For assets with accrued gains, larger gains result in higher sale probabilities in the first six months 
after acquisition of the asset.  This effect is attenuated in the next six months of asset holding and, 
after twelve months, larger gains exert a negative effect on sale probabilities.  Thus, controlling for 
holding period suggests that the disposition effect is concentrated among short-term holdings, while 
the capital gains tax lock-in effect prevails at longer holding periods.  For example, a capital gain of 
25% is associated with a 22% increase in the monthly hazard rate of selling stock in a taxable 
account during the first six months after purchase, but, conditional on having held the stock for one 
year, a 25% capital gain is associated with a 6% reduction in monthly hazards rates.  The differential 
impact of gains on realization behavior over different holding periods suggests that the Odean (1998) 
disposition result is driven by high-frequency traders with short-term horizons.  With respect to 
losses, the negative coefficient on LOSS*December is stronger if the stock was purchased within the 
prior six months, so that the loss would be treated as short-term under the income tax, than if the 
holding period is longer.  
The last two columns of Table 7 report separate hazard models for taxable and tax-deferred 
accounts.  The positive effect of GAIN on realization rates at short holding periods is more 
pronounced in tax-deferred than it is in taxable accounts.  The negative effect of accrued gains on 
realizations after a stock has been held for twelve months is statistically significantly different from 
zero for taxable accounts, but not for tax-deferred accounts.  For example, a capital gain of 25% is 
associated with a 22% increase in the monthly hazard rate of selling stock in a taxable account during 
the first six months since purchase (28% in tax-deferred accounts), but, conditional on having held 
the stock for one year, a 25% capital gain is associated with a 6% reduction in monthly hazard rates.  
There is no relation between past gains and subsequent sales after the stock has been held one year in 
tax-deferred accounts. 
The loss-realization effects in December are particularly strong in taxable accounts, although 
there is a statistically significant and substantively important effect for tax-deferred accounts as well.  
This realization of losses in the tax-deferred accounts in December cannot be attributed to tax effects 
and would seem to occur at an inopportune time, given the realization of losses occurring in taxable   16
accounts in December along with the historical boost in January returns for these previous loser 
stocks.  A larger loss reduces the probability of sale in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts, but the 
reduction is larger for tax-deferred accounts, where there is no tax benefit to realizing the loss, at 
least at short holding periods.   
The results in Table 7 assume that the tax incentives for realizing short and long-term gains 
remain stable throughout our sample period, even though they do not.  In 1993, the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act increased the top short-term capital gains tax rate from 31 percent to 39.6 percent.  
The long-term capital gains tax rate was capped at 28 percent throughout our sample period.  Thus, 
the incentive to realize losses short-term and to defer gains until they are long-term was greater after 
1993 than it had been before.  In unreported results, we allow the coefficients on LOSS*(0-6 month 
holding period) and LOSS*(7-12 month holding period) to differ before and after the short- term rate 
increase.  The coefficients on these LOSS variables interacted with December are between two and 
three times larger in the high tax-rate regime than they are in the low tax-rate regime, consistent with 
the greater incentive to realize short-term capital losses at year-end in the high tax-rate regime.  We 
also find a lower probability of recognizing short-term gains, particularly for positions held for less 
than six months, in the regime with the higher tax rate on short-term gains.  Thus, as predicted, 
households were less apt to realize short-term gains and more apt to realize short-term losses in 
December after the increase in short-term capital gains tax rates. 
The estimates in Tables 4 through 7 assume that hazard rates of selling are constant across 
stocks, conditional on their GAIN and LOSS history since purchase.  Models of optimal portfolio 
behavior, however, suggest that realization decisions should depend not only on the accrued capital 
gain or loss, but also on the volatility of the stock’s price.  For example, Constantinides (1984) 
proposes realizing losses of volatile stocks, before the opportunity to capture the associated tax 
deduction is lost.  On the other hand, if the disposition effect is a key determinant of trades, 
investors’ propensity to realize gains (losses) may increase (decrease) with volatility, as the 
likelihood of a gain turning to a loss and vice versa rises with volatility.     
To explore the effect of volatility on gain and loss realizations, Table 8 reports estimates of a 
generalized version of specifications (4) and (6) that includes interactions of an indicator variable for 
whether the stock has a gain or loss since purchase with the price volatility of the stock measured 
over the past 24 months.  The resulting coefficients on volatility are statistically significantly 
different from zero and they suggest that volatility has different effects on realization behavior 
depending on whether the stock has increased or decreased in value since the time of purchase.  A 
higher volatility stock with a gain is more likely to be sold, consistent with an expanded disposition   17
effect in which investors try to sell and thereby lock in gains on more volatile securities.  A higher 
volatility stock with a loss, however, is less likely to be sold than a comparable less-volatile stock 
with the same loss.  One potential explanation for this finding is that investors believe that it is more 
likely that a highly volatile stock that has declined since the time of purchase will rebound and 
generate a gain.  The volatility effects do not appear to differ between taxable and tax-deferred 
accounts. These results are not consistent with the tax-timing strategies discussed by Constantinides 
(1984), perhaps because of the presence of wash sale rules (an issue we explore address in Section III 
below). 
The last three columns of Table 8 show the impact of interacting volatility, indicator 
variables for gain or loss, and holding period indicators.  The strong positive effect of volatility on 
the realization probability for gains is concentrated at holding periods of less than twelve months.  At 
holding periods of more than one year, the positive effect of volatility on gain realization is greater 
for stocks held in tax-deferred accounts than it is for stocks held in taxable accounts, mirroring the 
results we find for returns. 
  The results in Table 8 suggest that there are differences in realization probabilities across 
different stocks.  Volatility is one characteristic that is correlated with such differences.  To allow for 
more general differences, we estimate hazard models like those in equation (6) with stock-specific 
baseline hazards.  We also estimate this specification with investor-specific baselines, revisiting the 
results reported in Table 4, but including a more elaborate set of covariates.  It is not possible to have 
both investor-specific and stock-specific hazard rates at the same time, as then the coefficients would 
only be estimated from the very few households that bought the same stock multiple times.  Table 9 
reports our findings from these models.  The first three columns present results from a model with 
investor-specific baselines, while the last three report results with stock-specific baselines.  Most of 
the coefficient estimates for GAIN, LOSS, and their interaction terms are similar to those in Table 7, 
although with investor-specific baselines the impact of GAIN on realization probabilities beyond the 
twelve-month horizon is only statistically significantly less than zero at the 90 percent confidence 
level.  With investor-specific baselines, we continue to find support for the disposition effect in both 
taxable and tax-deferred accounts, as well as increased tax-loss selling in December, although the 
point estimates of LOSS*December lack statistical significance over some holding periods.  The 
results in Table 9 nevertheless suggest that our earlier findings with respect to GAIN and LOSS are 
not simply an artifact of investor or stock heterogeneity.  For example, the relation between past 
performance and stock sales cannot be explained by buy-and-hold investors investing in large, value 
stocks that did not perform as well as technology stocks bought by short-horizon investors did.     18
  Even though the GAIN and LOSS coefficients are relatively stable, standard statistical tests 
reject the assumption of the same hazard function structure for all investors and for all firms.  The 
Grambsch-Therneau (1994) test for the validity of the proportional hazards model across all variables 
rejects this model at high confidence levels for tax-deferred accounts (p-value = 0.006) and 
marginally for taxable accounts (p-value = 0.092) when there is a single nonparametric baseline 
hazard.  The only variable that violates the proportionality assumption is the interaction between 
GAIN and a holding period of less than six months, suggesting that the hazard model has some 
difficulty handling the strong realization rates associated with very short-term gains.  However, with 
investor-specific nonparametric baseline hazards or with stock-specific baseline hazards, we no 
longer reject the null hypothesis of the proportional hazards model, suggesting the allowance of these 
forms of heterogeneity into the model accommodates the high realization rates associated with short-
term gains. 
  The results in Table 9 suggest that the coefficients on our covariates are not very sensitive to 
the inclusion of investor- or stock-specific baselines.  Yet the results do not convey a sense of the 
underlying heterogeneity in realization rates that these specifications permit.  To provide such a 
sense, we tabulate several summary statistics for the hazard rates associated with stock sales at 
holding periods of two through twelve months.  Figure 6 shows the dispersion of hazard rates both 
when we allow for investor-specific baseline hazards and when we allow for stock-specific baselines 
(i.e., the specifications displayed in Table 9).  The findings for the seventh month sale probabilities, 
for example, illustrate the range of selling probabilities.  The interquartile range for the hazard rates 
when we allow for stock-specific baselines is from a 3.2 percent probability of sale to an 8.3 percent 
probability.  When we allow for investor-specific baselines, the dispersion is even greater; the 
interquartile range in sale probabilities is from 4.4 percent to 12.8 percent.  These results suggest that 
there are some households with very low trading rates and other households with much higher rates.  
Nonetheless, after allowing for this dispersion in trading propensities in our model, the effect of past 
returns is essentially unchanged, suggesting that both heterogeneity and state dependence are 
important determinants of realization behavior. 
  Allowing for stock-specific and investor-specific baseline hazards relaxes one of the 
important restrictions associated with the proportional hazards model.  While we cannot allow for 
both types of baseline heterogeneity simultaneously, we can estimate models that allow for investor 
heterogeneity as well as a limited amount of stock-specific heterogeneity.  We do this by allowing for 
stock-specific intercept terms in the parametric part of the hazard model, along with investor-specific 
baselines.  Therefore, the model parallel to those in equations (3) and (4) would be:   19
( 3 ’ )           h i(t) = γi(t) * e
Xβij, t 
and  
(4’)            Xβij, t =  δj + β1*GAINi, t-1 +  β2*GAINi, t-1*Decemberi, t + β3*LOSSi, t-1 + 
  β4*LOSSi, t-1*Decemberi, t + β5*Decemberi, t + εi, t,  
where δj denotes a stock-specific intercept for firm j.  This specification allows stock-specific shifts 
in the level of the baseline hazard rate, but not in its shape.   
  Because of computational constraints, to estimate the model in (3’) and (4’) we need to 
restrict our sample to trades in a subset of stocks.  We focus on the one hundred stocks with the 
largest number of purchases in our sample.  While we have 677,422 stock-month observations in our 
complete data set for taxable accounts, the 100-largest-firm data subset contains 281,290 
observations.  When we include tax-deferred as well as taxable accounts, the change in sample size is 
from 1,002,382 observations to 417,594.  Table 10 reports estimates from this specification, as well 
as from the one that replaces (4’) with a more extensive set of covariates allowing for holding period 
interactions.   
  When we estimate (4’) for taxable accounts only, the coefficient on GAIN is small and 
statistically indistinguishable from zero, with a 25% gain since purchase leading to a 7% lower 
monthly hazard rate of sale in taxable accounts relative to tax-deferred accounts (i.e., e
(-0.30)*(-0.25) - 1 
= -0.07), comparable to the parsimonious specification with a single nonparametric baseline hazard 
presented in Table 4.  The evidence that losses reduce selling probabilities, except in December, also 
remains very clear.  The estimates in the third column, for example, suggest that in December the 
proportional difference in hazard rates between a taxable and a tax-deferred account for a stock with 
a 25 percent loss since purchase is e
(-5.13)*(-0.25) = 3.61.  Thus, a December sale is more than three 
times more likely in a taxable account as it is in a tax-deferred account.  When we disaggregate the 
GAIN effect by holding period, we still find a substantial positive effect of GAIN at holding periods 
of between one and six months, as the disposition effect dominates.  This effect, as well as a positive 
GAIN effect at holding periods between seven and twelve months, is much more pronounced in tax-
deferred accounts than it is in taxable accounts, consistent with the lock-in effect found earlier. 
B. Tax-Loss Selling and the Supply of Losses and Gains 
  One dimension along which investors differ, and which directly affects the tax cost of 
realizing gains and the tax benefit of realizing losses on a particular investment, is the amount of 
gains or losses realized elsewhere in their portfolio.  There is a $3,000 limit on the value of net   20
capital losses that can be used to offset other income.  Losses in excess of this amount must be 
carried forward to offset future gains or future ordinary income.  Poterba (1987) found that relatively 
few investors faced this limit as a binding constraint in the early 1980s, although more recent work 
by Auerbach, Burman, and Siegel (2000) suggests that this is currently a binding constraint for a 
substantial group of taxpayers.  For an individual investor, the incentive to realize losses at the end of 
the year is increasing in gains realized during the year-to-date. 
  Very few prior studies have been able to test for the impact of such incentives, primarily 
because of data limitations.  For investors in Finland, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001, 2004) use a 
unique data set on asset sales and tax liability and find that end-of-year tax-loss selling depends on 
whether investors have substantial losses or substantial gains from their trading activity earlier in the 
year.  In the U.S., Poterba and Weisbenner (2001), Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), and several 
other studies find evidence suggestive of this behavior using the year-to-date return on the aggregate 
stock market as a proxy for whether the household will have realized capital gains earlier in the year.  
They find that the amount of year-end loss realizations, the magnitude of the December decline, and 
the January increase in the price of stocks with embedded losses depend on whether the aggregate 
stock market has increased or declined during the year.  
  The present data set permits a more direct test of how end-of-year loss trading responds to an 
individual’s year-to-date portfolio realizations.  We can evaluate the net gain or loss realizations in 
the investor’s taxable account at this brokerage firm in the first eleven months of the year and then 
assess whether these realized gains or losses predict December realizations.  This measure of gains 
and losses is imperfect because we are only aware of the trades executed at the brokerage firm that 
provided the data and, moreover, we do not know the purchase price of some of the positions (e.g., 
those that were purchased prior to the start of the sample in January 1991).  Thus, we focus on the 
December trading activity of households for which we know the basis of stocks sold in the prior 
eleven months and hence can calculate the total realized capital gain or loss.  Because this is an 
imperfect measure, we also consider a second measure of demand for realized losses:  the stock 
market return in the first eleven months of the year.  While not all investors earn the market return, 
this should provide some indication of other losses or gains that are available.  We focus on trading 
decisions in December within the first 12 months since purchase and estimate a linear probability 
model for the probability of selling stock in December as a function of GAIN, LOSS, and these two 
measures of “loss demand.” 
  Table 11 reports our findings for the probability of selling stocks in December, with GAIN, 
LOSS, and our indicators of loss demand as the key covariates.  We consider trading in the month of   21
December as well as trading in the last week of that month.  The results show that, in taxable 
accounts, the likelihood of selling a stock that has declined since purchase rises if the market return 
for the year is negative.  For example, a 25% market return is associated with a two percentage point 
increase (i.e., 0.20*11.4) in the probability of realizing a loss in December, a rather large effect given 
that baseline hazard rates for December sales are less than ten percentage points.  There is a 
reduction in the chance of selling appreciated shares if the market has risen for the year, consistent 
with the notion that households will have fewer tax incentives to realize gains if they cannot be 
shielded with losses elsewhere in the portfolio.   
Similarly, we find a pronounced positive interaction effect of an indicator variable for a stock 
that has declined since its date of purchase and the total amount of capital gains realized during the 
year.  For example, a household with $5,000 of realized capital gains through November has a one-
percentage point higher likelihood of realizing a loss in December than a household with no 
realizations entering December does.  We do not find an effect from an interaction between an 
indicator for a stock with a gain since purchase and our measure of the gains realized during the year.   
While the left panel of Table 11 focuses on taxable accounts, the right panel focuses on the 
difference between taxable and tax-deferred accounts.  The impact of gain realizations on the 
probability of selling loss-producing stocks is clearly centered in the taxable rather than the tax-
deferred account.  In unreported analyses, we replicate the analysis in Table 11 for all the other 
calendar months.  We find that the effect of year-to-date realized capital gains realizations upon sales 
of stocks with losses (gains) is strongest (weakest) in the month of December.  Therefore, the closer 
the individual investor gets to the end of the year, and thus the clearer picture the investor has of the 
total capital gains that will be realized in the portfolio, the stronger the effects of realized gains in the 
portfolio on tax-loss selling.  These results suggest that at least some investors seek to minimize their 
tax liability through end-of-year tax trading and that activity elsewhere in the portfolio affects their 
trading decisions. 
C. Parametric Baseline Hazard Models 
  Our data set includes only six years of transactions data and thus does not report the purchase 
date for securities that were held by investors at the beginning of the sample period.  Therefore, the 
nonparametric baseline approach employed above cannot be used to estimate the probability of 
holding a stock for periods of more than six years.  One way to use these data to suggest patterns of 
longer-horizon trading behavior is to impose a functional structure on the hazard function at short 
holding periods, and then to invoke this functional form to make projections at longer holding   22
periods.  A simple parametric restriction of baseline hazard function, which yields the Gompertz 
proportional hazards function, constrains this baseline hazard to follow an exponential path: 
(7)      hi(t) = e
γ*t * e
Xβi, t, 
where the parameter γ determines the rate of decay, or growth, of the monthly baseline hazard rates. 
  To explore the fit of this functional form, we plot estimates for our entire data sample of the 
nonparametric baseline hazard, fitted values from the Gompertz baseline hazard, and two alternative 
parametric specifications, the Weibull and the log-normal.  Figure 7a considers the hazard rates of 
stock sales beginning in the second month after purchase, and Figure 7b considers sales conditional 
on the stock having been held for six months.  The log-normal and the Weibull decay too slowly to 
track the nonparametric baseline hazard, while the Gompertz functional form tracks the 
nonparametric baseline quite closely.  Both Wilcoxon and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests reject the 
goodness-of-fit of the Weibull and log-normal distributions at very high levels of confidence.  The 
Wilcoxon test does not reject the Gompertz model (p-value = 0.19), although the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test does, primarily because of the shape of the Gompertz function for short holding periods.  
If we focus on the fit of the Gompertz models at holding periods beyond six months, we do not reject 
the null hypothesis that the Gompertz describes the observed pattern of hazard rates.   
  In light of these findings, we use the Gompertz model as an alternative to the proportional 
hazards model with a nonparametric baseline.  Table 12 presents proportional hazards estimates that 
are similar to those in Table 7, but in which the Gompertz baseline hazard replaces the nonparametric 
baseline hazard.  Most of the key findings are very similar across the two tables.  GAIN continues to 
have a depressing effect on stock sales after a stock has been held for a given period, LOSS has a 
positive coefficient, so again a loss reduces the likelihood of selling stock and the LOSS*December 
coefficient suggests an important tax-loss selling effect at year-end.  The estimates of the Gompertz 
decay parameter, γ, suggest modest decay in the sale probability with the holding period, with the 
decay rate greater for taxable than for tax-deferred accounts.   
  The Gompertz parameters reported in Table 12 can be used to compute the expected holding 
period for common stock purchases.  Such computations are a natural input to the calculations of the 
expected burden of the capital gains tax and provide information about the economic importance of 
past performance in affecting stock sales.  Table 13 presents summary information on the sale 
probabilities and the expected holding periods conditional on a stock having been held for a given 
holding period, without conditioning on past performance.  The first two columns report summary 
values of the probability of selling a stock within a given time period after purchase.  The second two   23
columns indicate the probability that the stock will be sold within five years since the date of 
purchase, conditional on it having been held for various lengths of time.  
  The third pair of columns computes the probability that the stock will ever be sold.  This 
affects the prospective burden of the capital gains tax because stock that is held until the death of the 
owner qualifies for a “basis step up,” which effectively eliminates capital gains tax liability on the 
gains during the life of the owner.  The estimates of the probability that the stock is never sold are 
obtained via the Gompertz model.  Because of the exponential baseline, the cumulative probability of 
sale asymptotes to some constant that is less than or equal to one.  One minus this constant reflects 
the probability the stock is never sold.  Finally, the last two columns compute the expected holding 
period of the stock.  When calculating the expected holding period of the stock, the probability of no 
sale is multiplied by 20 years and then added to the product of the expected holding period, 
conditional on a sale being made (in a probabilistic sense), and the probability of sale as computed 
from the Gompertz model.  Thus, the expected holding periods are computed under the somewhat 
conservative assumption that the maximum holding period is 20 years.  We view the choice of 20 
years as indeed conservative; capital gains taxation upon realization and basis step-up at death could 
lead toward much larger holding periods. Moreover, hazard rates of selling stocks decline fairly 
sharply, approaching zero after only a few years since purchase. 
  The results suggest that, once stock has been held for a year, future turnover probabilities are 
modest.  According to the Gompertz model, there is a 65 percent chance that a stock held in a taxable 
account will never be sold if it has been held for one year.  The non-parametric estimate of the 
probability that the stock will be sold within five years since purchase conditional on being held one 
year is 32 percent.  Given that hazard rates asymptote to almost zero after a few years, this suggests 
that, if a stock is not sold within five years, the chance that it will ever be sold is very small.  Thus, 
the fact that the “probability stock is sold within five years” column plus the “probability of no sale” 
column approximately adds up to 100% provides indirect evidence of the appropriateness of the 
exponential baseline assumption that underlies the Gompertz model.  After two years of ownership, 
the probability that the stock will be sold within five years of purchase drops to 18 percent, and the 
chance that the stock will never be sold rises to 77 percent.  For a tax-deferred account, the 
probability of selling before five years from the time of purchase is higher (29 percent), and the 
probability of never selling is substantially lower (61 percent).  The rightmost columns show that the 
expected stock holding period for a stock in a taxable account at the time of purchase is just over six 
years months.  This expected holding period rises to just under 14 years after a stock has been held 
for a year.  The expected holding period for stocks in taxable accounts exceeds that in tax-deferred   24
accounts, with the expected difference in holding periods growing from nine months at the purchase 
date to 29 months conditional on the stock having been held a year.   
  The calculations in Table 13 do not distinguish between stocks with gains and losses since 
the time of purchase, yet the earlier hazard models suggest that the price trajectory has an important 
effect on turnover probabilities, with a capital gains lock-in effect emerging.  To illustrate the 
magnitude of the lock-in effect, we repeated the calculations in Table 13 assuming that a stock 
maintains a 50% gain.  The probability that a stock with a gain of 50% is never sold is estimated to 
be 61% if that stock is held in a taxable account, compared with 41% if it is held in a tax-deferred 
account.  The 20 percentage point differential is comparable to the 16 percentage point lower 
probability that a stock with an accrued capital gain will be sold within five years in a taxable 
account relative to a tax-deferred account.  The differential in hazard rates accumulates over time and 
leads to an estimated 29-month greater expected holding period for a stock with a 50% gain in a 
taxable account relative to a tax-deferred account.  If we condition on the stock having been held at 
least one year, the difference rises from 29 to 39 months.    
III. Evidence on Wash Sales and Restarting Tax Options 
  In some cases, particularly when realized losses are involved, the sale of a given stock 
position may not represent the end of an investor’s connection with this security.  If the stock sale is 
followed by another purchase of the same stock, then the sale may have been motivated by tax 
considerations and the investor may have sold even though his or her long-term objective was to hold 
the underlying security.  “Wash sale” restrictions preclude an investor from claiming the capital loss 
associated with a stock sale if the stock is repurchased within thirty days of the loss-generating sale.  
  There has been very little research on whether investors repurchase securities they have 
previously sold to realize tax losses.  One notable exception is Grinblatt and Keloharju’s (2004) 
analysis of Finnish data, which suggests that a substantial number of investors repurchase stocks that 
they sell to generate tax losses.  However, Finland does not have wash sale restrictions, so an 
individual can repurchase a share immediately after selling for a tax loss, and the trade will not 
disallow the tax benefit associated with the loss realization.  In the United States, the 30-day loss sale 
requirement makes it more difficult to generate a tax loss without some change in portfolio 
characteristics.  The extent of portfolio dislocation is unclear, however, because an investor could 
purchase a security that is highly correlated with the one that has just been sold and hold this security 
until the original security is repurchased.    25
  Table 14 shows the probability that an investor repurchases a security within 30 days since 
the date of sale.  The table considers stocks purchased in both taxable and tax-deferred accounts.  It 
also distinguishes sales on which the investor realized a gain from those on which there was a loss.  
Wash sale restrictions only apply to losses in taxable accounts.  We first examine the propensity to 
repurchase stocks in a taxable account following sales in December and in all other months. We 
distinguish December on the grounds that tax-motivated sales are most likely to occur in that month.  
The first column of Table 14 focuses on sales with realized losses.  For sales in taxable accounts in 
December, there is a 4.5 percent chance that the investor will repurchase the security in the taxable 
account during the thirty days after sale, thereby voiding the tax benefits associated with loss 
realization.  The analogous probability for sales that occur in months other than December is 8.5 
percent, with the differential probability of –4.0 percent being highly significant.  These results 
suggest that investors are less likely to repurchase stocks with losses when they sell them in 
December than in other months, which we interpret as evidence that investors are more tax-conscious 
in their December sales.  These results are also in direct contrast to Grinblatt and Keloharju (2004), 
who find that the investors who realize losses in December in Finland, where there are no wash sale 
rules, are more apt to immediately repurchase the stock than are the investors realizing losses in other 
calendar months. 
  The second column of Table 14 presents information on the probability of repurchasing the 
stock after realizing a gain.  The probability of repurchasing the stock after a gain realization is 
greater than the respective probability of repurchasing following tax-loss sales.  For December sales 
in taxable accounts, there is a 10.4 percent chance that the gain-producing stock is repurchased in a 
taxable account within a month.  The third column summarizes the difference between the 
probabilities of repurchasing a stock when the sale generated a loss and when it generated a gain.  
For sales in taxable accounts, the difference in the probability of repurchasing a share in a taxable 
account within 30 days when that share has been sold for a loss and when the share has been sold for 
a gain is –5.9 percent when the sale occurs in December, the comparable difference being –3.6 for 
sales in non-December months, with the difference in differences a statistically significant –2.3. 
  The right panel of Table 14 presents estimates of the probability a stock that has been sold is 
repurchased in the second month following the sale.  Unlike the repurchase activity in the first month 
after the sale, which is subject to wash sale rules and is significantly lower for losses realized in 
December relative to other months, there is no differential in repurchase rates during the second 
month after purchase.  However, if the wash sale rules resulted in pent-up demand to repurchase the   26
stock sold at a loss in December, one might expect a boost in the repurchase rate in the second month 
following these tax-motivated sales.  We find no evidence of such an effect. 
  Our results suggest that wash sale rules reduce the probability that a stock is immediately 
repurchased following a tax-loss sale in December.  Because, by definition, investors in our sample 
have both taxable and tax-deferred accounts, it is possible for a stock purchase in a tax-deferred 
account to follow a sale in a taxable account.  Hermann (2003) notes that the IRS has issued 
conflicting guidance regarding the extent to which these transactions may affect the use of tax losses 
to offset other income.  Table 15 reports the probability of purchasing the same stock in a tax-
deferred account following a sale in a taxable account.  It also considers the probability of 
repurchasing in a tax-deferred account following a sale in that account.  Since there are no wash sale 
rules to restrict sales followed by purchases in these accounts, the rate of repurchase in the tax-
deferred accounts may provide a baseline against which to judge the behavior in taxable accounts.  
The results suggest that, even though wash sale rules potentially could have been skirted with 
offsetting transactions in taxable and tax-deferred accounts, such trades were relatively rare.   
The low frequency of wash sales is a challenge to the predictions of optimizing models of 
capital gain realizations such as Constantinides (1984), Dammon, Dunn, and Spatt (1989), and 
Dammon and Spatt (1996).  In these models, provided transaction costs are low enough and 
especially when there is a differential between the tax rate on short-term and long-term gains, 
investors have incentives to sell shares and realize losses and then to purchase shares again so that 
over a longer horizon their portfolio is not affected by their tax-trading activity.  However, we find 
that few investors are realizing losses and subsequently repurchasing securities.   
IV.  Conclusion 
  This paper offers novel evidence on the stock-trading pattern of individual investors.  In past 
work, it has been difficult to assess the importance of tax-related and psychological motivations to 
trade because the two have offsetting implications for the effect of past returns on stock realizations.  
Comparing investors’ realizations in their taxable and tax-deferred accounts provides a means to 
identify the magnitude of tax-motivated trading.  Using data from a large discount brokerage house, 
we find evidence of a lock-in effect for capital gains, i.e., a desire to postpone stock sales and their 
associated tax liability, in taxable accounts.  This effect is more pronounced for larger stock 
purchases and it intensifies the longer the stock has been held.  We also present evidence of a higher 
propensity to realize losses in taxable accounts relative to tax-deferred accounts throughout the 
calendar year,  with tax-loss selling being most pronounced in December.  Year-end tax-loss selling   27
is stronger among households that have realized net capital gains during the year, and if the holding 
period of the stock would allow the loss to qualify for short-term tax treatment. 
  An appealing feature of the brokerage house data is that we observe individuals trading 
several times, and we find substantial heterogeneity in individuals’ propensity to sell stock.  
However, the results obtained are robust to controls for investor heterogeneity in trading behavior 
and stock-specific characteristics, suggesting both investor heterogeneity and past performance are 
important in explaining stock sales.  Finally, losses realized in taxable accounts in December appear 
to be affected by wash sale restrictions.  The chance that a stock will be repurchased within 30 days, 
if sold at a loss in December, is substantially lower than the chance of such a repurchase following 
sales in other months. 
  Our findings on the path-dependence of stock sale probabilities and the substantial 
differences between realization rates for appreciated and depreciated stocks suggest that modeling 
the burden of the capital gains tax must move beyond simple models with a constant probability of 
asset sale, such as those developed by Bailey (1969) and Protopapadakis (1983).  Our results further 
suggest that some investors are sensitive to tax incentives, while others are tax-oblivious.  Barber and 
Odean (2004) note that investors trade with higher frequency in their taxable than they do in their 
tax-deferred accounts.  On its face, this finding appears inconsistent with tax minimization, yet our 
results suggest that there are important differences between trading in taxable and tax-deferred 
accounts and that these differences are consistent with tax incentives affecting trading in taxable 
accounts. 
  Given the evident heterogeneity in trading patterns, there is a clear need for a framework that 
can be used to categorize investors as tax-efficient or tax-insensitive.  One way to do this is by 
studying the number of investors who fail to execute tax-reducing trades.  In our data set, 21 percent 
of all stock purchases of $10,000 or more resulted in a realized loss within one year, and 38 percent 
resulted in a realized gain within a year.  Of the remaining 40 percent of stock purchases, 18 percent 
(45 percent of this category) had losses at the end of twelve months that could have been realized, but 
were not.  This suggests that nearly one-half of the investors who could have realized a short-term 
loss did not avail themselves of the opportunity.  We cannot conclude that investors who did not 
realize short-term losses were foregoing substantial tax benefits because they might have been unable 
to use the tax losses to reduce their tax liability, but we suspect that many of these investors could 
have reduced their tax liability by realizing the losses.  Measuring the cost to investors of such tax-
inefficient behavior is a clear avenue for future research.   28
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TABLE 1—SUMMARY STATISTICS ON COMMON STOCK PURCHASES 
 
  All Accounts    Taxable Accounts  Tax-deferred Accounts 
























































































































































Notes: Sample consists of 23,877 households that had both taxable and tax-deferred accounts and that purchased at least one stock 
between 1/91 and 11/96.  The values in parentheses are median dollar amounts.  Values in brackets are averages that weigh different 
purchases by the size of the purchase.   
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TABLE 2—DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE STOCK SALES 
Panel A: Distribution by Holding Period 
  Aggregate Stock Sales Reported on 
Tax Returns (in percent) 
Stock Sales in Taxable Accounts during 
1995 in Brokerage Data (in percent) 
Length of time 
held (months)  1985  1997  1998 1999  Full Sample  Sales of $10,000+ 
Purchases 
1 14.0   21.3   27.2 34.6 21.3   37.7  
2 – 3  11.8   18.6   14.6 15.4 19.3   22.9  
4 – 6  11.8   14.0   13.8 12.7 15.1   13.7  
7 – 12  15.8   17.5   17.3 14.6 14.6   10.0  
13 – 18  13.7   10.0   10.3 8.9 9.7   6.0  
19 – 24  12.3   6.8   6.1 5.0 6.8   3.7  
25 – 36  14.4   7.4   7.3 5.8 8.4   4.1  
37 – 48  6.3   4.4   3.4 3.0 4.9   1.9  
Panel B:  Distribution by Holding Period and Calendar Month, Breakdown by Realized 
Gain or Loss 
  Aggregate Stock Sales Reported on 
Tax Returns in 1997 (in percent) 
Stock Sales  in Taxable Account during 
1995 in Brokerage Data (in percent) 
  Percent of Stock Sales by Holding Period 
Length of time 
held (months)  Sold w/Gain  Sold w/Loss  Sold w/Gain  Sold w/Loss 
1 20.4 22.9   21.2   21.3
2 – 3  17.4 20.6   19.7   18.5
4 – 6  13.1 15.7   15.8   13.7
7 – 12  17.4 17.8   15.7   12.6
13 – 18  10.8 8.6   9.4   10.1
19 – 24  7.4 5.9   6.2   8.0
25 – 36  8.7 5.3   7.6   9.8
37 – 48  4.9 3.3   4.4   5.9
  Percent of Stock Sales in December 
Short-term 
holding period  7.7  12.7   6.6   16.2  
Long-term 
holding period  9.5  17.9   6.4   18.2  
All holding 
periods 
8.4  14.2   6.6   16.9  
Notes: The aggregate sales of corporate stock reported on tax returns are provided by Auten and 
Wilson (1999), Wilson (2002), and Wilson (2003) and authors’ calculations. The table focuses 
on stocks held at most four years. Annual S&P 500 returns are as follows:  1985 = 32%, 1995 = 
38%, 1997 = 33%, 1998 = 29%, and 1999 = 21%. The short-term holding period is 12 months or 
less and the long-term holding period is more than twelve months.   32
TABLE 3—REGRESSION OF MONTHLY HAZARD RATE OF SELLING STOCK UPON CUMULATIVE 
RETURN ON STOCK ENTERING THE MONTH, PURCHASES ≥ $10,000 (FIGURES 5A AND 5B) 
  Probability of selling stock in 
taxable account 
Probability of selling stock in  
taxable account relative to selling  




baseline  GAIN LOSS  Constant: 
baseline  GAIN LOSS 
1 month  
   
23.4 
(0.8) 
***      2.7
(1.4)
**   
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Notes: Sample restricted to stock purchases of at least $10,000.  The specification is: 
Selli, t =  αt + β1, t*GAINi, t-1 + β2, t*LOSSi, t-1 + εi,t, 
where GAIN = max(return, 0), LOSS = min(return, 0). Standard errors (shown in parentheses) 
allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across observations of the same household. 
***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   33
TABLE 4—COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL OF STOCK SALES, FULL SAMPLE AND LARGE 
PURCHASES (AT LEAST $10,000), WITH AND WITHOUT INVESTOR-SPECIFIC BASELINE HAZARD 
  Full Sample  Full Sample – 
 Investor-Specific Baseline 
































*   0.21
(0.01)






































































Original Purchase at least $10,000
 
Original Purchase at least $10,000 – 
Investor-Specific Baseline 
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***   0.11
(0.03)





































































Notes: GAIN = max(return, 0) and LOSS = min(return, 0). Standard errors (shown in 




* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.     34
TABLE 5—COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL OF STOCK SALES, STRATIFIED BY VALUE OF STOCK PURCHASE 
  Model estimated for taxable accounts   Model estimated for all accounts (effect of taxable 
account relative to tax-deferred reported) 






















































































Number of Obs.  965,998  976,613  829,498  677,422  1,836,721  1,762,347  1,395,918  1,002,382
Notes: GAIN = max(return, 0) and LOSS = min(return, 0).  The Cox proportional hazards model employs a non-parametric estimate 
of the baseline hazard, λ0,i(t), which denotes the probability of selling stock t months after purchase conditional on no prior sale. 
Standard errors (shown in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across observations of the same household. 
***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6—COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL OF STOCK SALES, STRATIFIED BY TOTAL HOUSEHOLD BROKERAGE ACCOUNT VALUE 
AT END OF YEAR PRIOR TO STOCK PURCHASE, FULL SAMPLE OF STOCK PURCHASES IN TAXABLE ACCOUNTS 
    Total Household Brokerage Account Value (in $000s) 
    0 – 25    25 –100    100+  All Households 
GAIN 
 





























































































Interactions of Variables with $10,000+ Buy Indicator
 




***    -0.41
(0.06)











    0.10
(0.16)











***    0.82
(0.15)







     LOSS*December 
  -0.54
(0.43)
    -0.89
(0.26)











    -0.05
(0.06)







     $10,000+ 
     Buy indicator 
  0.43
(0.03)
***    0.47
(0.02)
















Number of Observations  753,618  895,290  972,854  2,621,762 
Notes: GAIN = max(return, 0) and LOSS = min(return, 0).  December is a dummy variable denoting the month of December. Standard 
errors (shown in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across observations of the same household. 
***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   36
TABLE 7—COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL OF STOCK SALES FOR LARGE PURCHASES 
(AT LEAST $10,000) 
All accounts   
Taxable 













































































































































Number of Observations  677,422    1,002,382 
Notes: GAIN = max(return, 0) and LOSS = min(return, 0).  The Cox proportional hazards 
model employs a non-parametric estimate of the baseline hazard.  Standard errors (shown in 
parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across observations of the 
same household.   
***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   37
TABLE 8—COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL OF STOCK SALES, CONTROLLING FOR 
VOLATILITY,  FOR LARGE PURCHASES (AT LEAST $10,000) 
























***   -0.33
(0.05)






(w/in 6 mos after purchase) 
 
       0.51
(0.08)






(mos 7 – 12 after purchase) 
 
       0.15
(0.09)











*   -0.22
(0.16)











**   0.86
(0.15)






(w/in 6 mos after purchase) 
 
       1.03
(0.21)






(mos 7 – 12 after purchase) 
 
       0.06
(0.23)











***   -2.50
(0.22)





     






   1.69
(0.35)






(w/in 6 mos after purchase) 
 
       2.03
(0.37)






(mos 7 – 12 after purchase) 
 
       2.10
(0.44)











   -1.09
(0.43)






(w/in 6 mos after purchase) 
 
       0.03
(0.47)






(mos 7 – 12 after purchase) 
 
       -0.80
(0.57)





Number of Observations    617,031  915,284  617,031   915,284 
Notes: GAIN = max(return, 0) and LOSS = min(return, 0).  The Cox proportional hazards 
model employs a non-parametric estimate of the baseline hazard.  Standard errors (shown in 
parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across observations of the 
same household.   
***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   38
TABLE 9—COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL OF STOCK SALES WITH INVESTOR-SPECIFIC 
OR STOCK-SPECIFIC BASELINE HAZARDS  FOR LARGE PURCHASES (AT LEAST $10,000) 
   Investor-Specific Baselines    Stock-Specific Baselines 

























   -0.24
(0.06)













***   0.48
(0.09)
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(0.09)











*   0.05
(0.17)













   0.11
(0.26)













   -0.28
(0.31)











   1.36
(0.16)













   1.28
(0.20)













**   0.16
(0.22)











   -3.00
(0.30)













**   -0.16
(0.41)













   0.02
(0.45)











**   -0.06
(0.09)













   0.18
(0.10)













   0.24
(0.12)





Number of Observations    677,422  1,002,382  677,422   1,002,382 
Notes: GAIN = max(return, 0) and LOSS = min(return, 0).  The Cox proportional hazards 
model employs a non-parametric estimate of the baseline hazard.  Standard errors (shown in 
parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across observations of the 
same household.   
***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   39
TABLE 10—COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL OF STOCK SALES WITH HOUSEHOLD-
SPECIFIC AND FIRM-SPECIFIC BASELINE HAZARDS, SAMPLE RESTRICTED TO 100 MOST-
PURCHASED STOCKS IN TAXABLE ACCOUNTS AND LARGE PURCHASES (AT LEAST $10,000) 


































(w/in 6 mos after purchase) 
 










(mos 7 – 12 after purchase) 
 

























(w/in 6 mos after purchase) 
 










(mos 7 – 12 after purchase) 
 

























(w/in 6 mos after purchase) 
 










(mos 7 – 12 after purchase) 
 















***   -1.68
(0.61)






(w/in 6 mos after purchase) 
 










(mos 7 – 12 after purchase) 
 

























(w/in 6 mos after purchase) 
 










(mos 7 – 12 after purchase) 
 









Number of Observations    281,290  417,594  28,290    417,594 
Notes: GAIN = max(return, 0) and LOSS = min(return, 0).  The Cox proportional hazards 
model employs a non-parametric estimate of the baseline hazard.  Standard errors (shown in 
parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across observations of the 
same household.   
***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   40
TABLE 11—REGRESSION OF PROBABILITY OF SELLING STOCK IN DECEMBER ON PRIOR PERFORMANCE INTERACTED WITH HOUSEHOLD’S 
CAPITAL GAIN/LOSS REALIZATIONS DURING CALENDAR YEAR AND MARKET PERFORMANCE DURING CALENDAR YEAR, 
FOR LARGE PURCHASES (AT LEAST $10,000) 
 
  Probability sell taxable-account stock (in percent)  Probability of selling stock in taxable account relative to 
selling stock in tax-deferred account (in percent) 
  December: All Month  December: Last Week  December: All Month  December: Last Week 





















































































  0.02 
(0.03) 
       -0.09
(0.09)
      
  -0.38
(0.24)
*       -0.02
(0.31)




  0.22 
(0.09) 
***       0.49
(0.24)
**      
  0.38
(0.11)
***       0.48
(0.27)








**      -7.4
(4.3)
*    
    -3.5
(3.2)






   
  11.4
 (3.0)
***     33.8
(7.3)
***    
    11.2
(3.6)
***       17.3
(8.8)
** 
Notes: For columns (2), (5), (8), and (11): SELL DECEMBERi, t = α +β1*GAINi, t-1 +β2*LOSSi, t-1 + β3*CG_Realizedt-1*STOCK_UPi, t-1 + 
β4*CG_Realizedt-1*STOCK_DOWNi, t-1 +εi,t.  For columns (3), (6), (9), and (12): SELL DECEMBERi, t =  α + β1*GAINi, t-1 + β2*LOSSi, t-1 + 
β3*MKT_RETt-1*STOCK_UPi, t-1 + β4*MKT_RETt-1*STOCK_DOWNi, t-1 + εi,t. GAIN = max(return, 0) and LOSS = min(return, 0).  STOCK_UP 
(STOCK_DOWN) is an indicator variable reflecting that the stock price rose (fell) from its purchase date through the end of November.  
CG_Realizedt-1 = net capital gain/loss realized via sales of stock in a taxable account during the calendar year through the end of November 
(through the last five trading days of December for the December – Last Week regressions).  MKT RETt-1 = value-weighted CRSP capital 
appreciation return during the calendar year through the end of November (through the last five trading days of December for the December – Last 
Week regressions).  All coefficients have been appropriately scaled to correspond to monthly realization rates, so that the coefficients from the 
month and week regressions are comparable.  Standard errors (shown in parentheses) allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across 
observations of the same household. 
***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.   41
TABLE 12—GOMPERTZ PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL OF STOCK SALES FOR LARGE 
PURCHASES (AT LEAST $10,000) 
All accounts   
Taxable 




















































































































































Gamma (rate of decay γ)   -0.067
(0.001)





Number of Observations  677,422    1,002,382 
Notes: GAIN = max(return, 0) and LOSS = min(return, 0).  Standard errors (shown in parentheses) 
allow for heteroskedasticity as well as correlation across observations of the same household. 
 ***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
   42
TABLE 13—PROBABILITY OF SALE AND EXPECTED HOLDING PERIOD FOR LARGE STOCK PURCHASES (AT LEAST $10,000) 
Probability of stock sold 
Within given time period 
Probability of stock sold 
within 5 years since purchase
conditional on 
having held the stock for 
the given time period 
Probability of 
no sale of stock 
conditional on 
having held the stock for 








since purchase  taxable tax-deferred  taxable  tax-deferred taxable tax-deferred taxable  tax-deferred
Time 0: 
purchase date  NA  NA  76%  78%  29%  24%  75 mos.  64 mos. 
1 month  23%  21%  67%  73%  38%  29%  98 mos.  78 mos. 
6 months  49%  49%  45%  56%  54%  42%  140 mos.  115 mos. 
1 year  59%  60%  32%  44%  65%  50%  167 mos.  138 mos. 
2 years  67%  69%  18%  29%  77%  61%  196 mos.  168 mos. 
3 years  72%  75%  9%  14%  84%  66%  212 mos.  185 mos. 
Notes: 
* The probability that the stock is never sold is estimated by the proportional hazards Gompertz model.  When calculating the 
expected holding period of the stock, the probability of no sale is multiplied by 20 years and then added to the product of the expected 
holding period, conditional on a sale being made (in a probabilistic sense), and the probability of sale as estimated by the proportional 
hazards Gompertz model..  43
TABLE 14—PROPENSITY TO REPURCHASE SAME STOCK IN TAXABLE ACCOUNT WITHIN ONE AND 
TWO MONTHS SINCE SALE IN TAXABLE ACCOUNTS, FOR LARGE STOCK PURCHASES 
(AT LEAST $10,000) 
Propensity to Repurchase Stock within  
One Month since Sale    Propensity to Repurchase Stock during 
Second Month since Sale 
Sale with  
Realized 
Loss 




Sale with  
Realized 
Loss 




Sales in December  Sales in December 
4.5 
(0.6) 











Sales in non-December Months  Sales in non-December Months 
8.5 
(0.4) 











Difference (December – All Other Months)  Difference (December – All Other Months) 
-4.0 
(0.6) 











Notes: Sample consists of sales of stock from January 1991 to October 1996, originally 
purchased for at least $10,000. 
***,  
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels.   44
TABLE 15—PROPENSITY TO REPURCHASE SAME STOCK IN TAXABLE AND TAX-DEFERRED 
ACCOUNTS WITHIN 30 DAYS SINCE LOSS REALIZATION, FOR LARGE STOCK PURCHASES 
(AT LEAST $10,000) 
 
 
  Realization of Loss  
in TAXABLE account 




  Sales in December 
Purchase in Taxable Account  





***  1.8 
(0.7) 
*** 
Purchase in Tax-Deferred Account  









  Sales in non-December Months 
Purchase in Taxable Account  





***  2.5 
(0.3) 
*** 
Purchase in Tax-Deferred Account  









  Difference (December – All Other Months) 
Purchase in Taxable Account  





***  -0.7 
(0.7) 
 
Purchase in Tax-Deferred Account  











* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.    45
 
Figure 1:  Hazard Rate of Having Sold Stock 



















UNCONDITIONAL GAIN Entering Month LOSS Entering Month
Notes: Sample is January purchases of stock 1991-96 in taxable accounts.  The hazard rate for 
stock purchases unconditional on the stock’s price performance, as well as conditional on 
whether the stock has an accrued capital gain or loss entering the month, is displayed.   46
 
Figure 2:  Hazard Rate of Having Sold Stock in Taxable and 

















GAIN Entering Month, Taxable Account
LOSS Entering Month, Taxable Account
GAIN Entering Month, Tax-Deferred Account
LOSS Entering Month, Tax-Deferred Account
Notes: Sample is January purchases of stock of at least $10,000 from 1991-96.  The hazard rate 
for stock purchases conditional on whether the stock has an accrued capital gain or loss entering 
the month is displayed for taxable and tax-deferred accounts.  47


















GAIN Entering Month, Full Sample LOSS Entering Month, Full Sample
GAIN Entering Month, Original Buy at least $10,000 LOSS Entering Month, Original Buy at least $10,000
 
Notes: Sample is January purchases of stock 1991-96 in taxable accounts.  If h(t) denotes the hazard rate in month t, the probability 
that the stock is sold by the end of month t is [ 1 –  ( Πs=1,t (1-h(s)) ) ].   48
   
Figure 4:  Cumulative Probability of Having Sold Stock in 

















GAIN Entering Month, Full Sample LOSS Entering Month, Full Sample
GAIN Entering Month, Original Buy at least $10,000 LOSS Entering Month, Original Buy at least $10,000
 
Notes: Sample is January purchases of stock 1991-96.  If h(t) denotes the hazard rate in month t, the probability that the stock is sold 
by the end of month t is [ 1 –  ( Πs=1,t (1-h(s)) ) ].  Figure 4 displays cumulative probability of sale in a taxable account less that in a 
tax-deferred account for each month.   49
 
 
Fi gure 5a:  Added Li kel i hood of Sal e i n Taxabl e Account wi th respect to Stock 
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G ain of 25%  E ntering M onth Loss of -25%  Enteri ng M onth
 
Notes: Added likelihood of selling stock with a 25% gain (loss) since purchase with respect to a stock with zero appreciation is 
estimated from the following regression separately for taxable and tax-deferred accounts:  Selli, t =  αt + β1, t*GAINi, t-1 + β2, t*LOSSi, t-1 
+ εi,t, where GAIN = max(return, 0), LOSS = min(return, 0).  The added likelihood of sale is then β1, t*GAINi, t-1 or β2, t*LOSSi, t-1.  
Figure 5a displays the results for taxable accounts.  Figure 5b displays the results for taxable accounts less the results for tax-deferred 
accounts.   50
 
Figure 5b:  Added Likelihood of Sale in Taxable Account Relative to Tax Deferred 
Account with respect to Stock with Zero Appreciation Since Purchase Date, 




















Gain of 25% Entering Month Loss of -25% Entering Month
 
Notes: Added likelihood of selling stock with a 25% gain (loss) since purchase with respect to a stock with zero appreciation is 
estimated from the following regression separately for taxable and tax-deferred accounts:  Selli, t =  αt + β1, t*GAINi, t-1 + β2, t*LOSSi, t-1 
+ εi,t, where GAIN = max(return, 0), LOSS = min(return, 0).  The added likelihood of sale is then β1, t*GAINi, t-1 or β2, t*LOSSi, t-1.  
Figure 5a displays the results for taxable accounts.  Figure 5b displays the results for taxable accounts less the results for tax-deferred 
accounts.    51
 
Figure 6a:  Heterogeneity in Hazard 



















10th pctile 25th pctile 50th pctile
75th pctile 90th pctile
Figure 6b:  Heterogeneity in Hazard 
















10th pctile 25th pctile 50th pctile
75th pctile 90th pctile
 
Notes: Figure 6a displays the distribution of investor-specific baseline hazard rates for households with 50 or more purchases taken 
from the regression estimated with investor-specific baselines for taxable accounts in Table 9.  Figure 6b displays the distribution of 
stock-specific baseline hazard rates for stocks purchased 50 or more times, taken from the regression estimated with stock-specific 
baselines for taxable accounts in Table 9.   52
  

















Non-parametric Weibull Log-Normal Gompertz
 
Figure 7b:  Monthly Hazard Rates of Selling Stock 
in Taxable Account, 




















Non-parametric Weibull Log-Normal Gompertz
 
Notes: Sample is purchases of stocks in taxable accounts of at least $10,000 from 1991-96.   